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PATENT LICENSING AGREEMENTS AND ANTI-TRUST IN THE
EEC: RECENT DECISIONS OF THE EEC COMMISSION
I. Introduction
In a series of recent cases, the Commission of the European Community
has redefined the limitations on the terms of patent licensing agreements in the
European Economic Community (the Common Market), in relation to the
Community goals of encouraging the maximum development of free competition,
within the Community while also encouraging technical and economic progress.
These decisions interpret the application of Art. 85 of the Treaty of Rome to
patent licensing agreements.' Art. 85(1) prohibits all agreements between
enterprises that are likely to affect trade between member states of the Common
Market and whose object or effect is to prevent, restrict, or distort competition
within the Common Market. Even where an agreement is held to restrict com-
petition under Art. 85(1), Art. 85(3) provides that the provisions of Art. 85(1)
may be declared inapplicable to agreements that help to improve the production
or distribution of products or to promote technical or economic progress, while
meeting certain other criteria. In applying Art. 85 to patent licensing agree-
ments, the Commission has paid special attention to market factors in deter-
mining whether a particular agreement is permissible. Patent licensing agree-
ments can have the effect of splitting markets along national lines and of restrict-
ing competition, yet such effects may be commercially justifiable and necessary
for proper exploitation of the patent. In the 1962 Notice on Patent Licensing
Agreements,' the Commission set out a policy statement with regard to patent
license terms which did not fall under Art. 85. Commission decisions in recent
cases, however, have modified and partially overruled this Notice, and the Com-
mission in these cases has stressed the need to assess the propriety of particular
license terms with regard to the market situation involved in the particular
case.' In these decisions, the Commission examined the particular economic
circumstances of each agreement, and of particular clauses within each agree-
ment, to balance the effects on competition with the economic benefits to be
derived. The result is that the application of Art. 85 to patent licensing agree-
ments is very flexible, and also very complicated for the foreign company wishing
to enter into such arrangements with a European firm. This Note examines
the general approach of the Common Market to patent licensing, and the appli-
cation of this approach to particular license terms, in light of recent Commission
cases.
I Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3. Articles of the EEC Treaty will be cited without
further reference. The provisions of the Treaty and implementing regulations may be found
in the CCH COMMON MARKET REPORTER.
2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2698 (1962) [hereinafter cited as CCI-]. The Notice on
Patent Licensing Agreements is hereinafter referred to as the Notice.
3 Re Burroughs-Delplanque, CCH 11 9485 (1972); Re Burroughs-Geha-Werke, C-
1 9486 (1972); Re Davidson Rubber, CCH 9512 (1972); Re Raymond-Nagoya, COlI
9513 (1972).
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II. Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome
By the Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, France, West Germany, Italy and
the Benelux countries established the European Economic Community (EEC),
also known as the Common Market. The goal of the Treaty was the eventual
economic and political unification of the member countries. Economic unifica-
tion is to be achieved by eliminating national barriers to the free movement
of goods and services within the Community.4 The Treaty foresees a large, open,
unified market, not restricted by national boundaries. Such a market relies
largely on free competition of businesses operating throughout the Common
Market. By Art. 3(f), one of the aims of the Community is "the establishment
of a system ensuring that competition shall not be distorted in the Common
Market." The major provision establishing rules of competition in the Com-
mon Market is Art. 85 of the Treaty.5 Art. 85(1) prohibits agreements
and concerted practices between undertakings "which are liable to affect trade
between Member States and which are designed to prevent, restrict, or distort
competition within the Common Market or which have this effect." Under
Art. 85(2) such agreements are void.6 The intention of Art. 85(1) is clearly
4 Among the methods toward this end are the elimination of customs duties between
Member States (Arts. 12-17), the establishment of a common external tariff (Arts. 18-29),
and articles providing for the free movement of persons, services and capital (Arts. 48-73).
See C. FULDA & W. SCHWARTZ, REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 107
(1970). The fact that an agreement in violation of Art. 85(1) is void can be a strong deter-
rent to such violations. It means that the contract will not be enforced in a civil suit even
if valid under national law. In Re Agfa-Optima, 2 C.M.L.R. 268 (1963), a German court
held that an agreement for price maintenance and restriction of exports, though valid under
German law, was not enforceable as it was within the scope of Art. 85(1) and had not been
notified to the Commission of the European Communities. See A. CAMPBELL, RESTRICTIVE
TRADING AGREEMENTS IN THE COMMON MARKET, 154 (1964). The European Court of
justice held in Consten-Grundig, CCH ff 8046 (1966), that the nullity imposed by Art. 85(2)
affects only the offending elements in the agreement whenever such elements are severable.
5 The text of Article 85 reads:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings, and concerted practices which
may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the preven-
tion, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and in particular
those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading con-
ditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage,
have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:
-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
-any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
-any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting tech-
nical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and
which does not:
'(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable
to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of




to break down barriers to free competition within the Common Market and to
prevent private agreements from maintaining the barriers which the member
states have agreed to remove. Agreements which are void under Art. 85 (1) in-
clude those limiting production, markets, and technical development, as well
as market-sharing agreements. Such agreements, and in particular exclusive
dealing agreements on national lines, would maintain the traditional European
pattern based on national units in which distributors or licensees are given
exclusive rights by foreign producers and licensors.' It is this pattern which
the Treaty is attempting to transform into a Community-wide market. An ex-
ample of the conflicts involved can be seen in Grundig and Consten v. EEC
Commission.' In that case the German manufacturer, Grundig, had entered
into an agreement with Consten, its French distributor of electrical appliances,
by which Consten was given exclusive French rights to the trademark "GINT,"
while agreeing not to export from France. The intent of this agreement was to
give Consten an exclusive distributorship, protected by French trademark law.
This would permit the division of the European market along national bound-
aries, with each of the national distributors free from competition in the trade-
marked products. The European Court of Justice held that this agreement con-
travened Art. 85, despite the fact that it was valid under French law, because
it restricted trade between EEC countries in the goods distributed. The facts
of the case indicate the strength of the commercial interest in dividing markets
on national grounds, and the decision indicates the intention of the Common
Market to use Art. 85 to press toward more truly European markets, even to
the extent of nullifying national laws.
The Treaty in Art. 85 (3) recognized that there can be advantages to some
restrictions on competition. It provides that an agreement which violates Art.
85(1) may nonetheless be permitted if it "helps to improve the production or
distribution of goods or to promote technical or economic progress." In addi-
tion, such an agreement must allow consumers a fair share of the profit that
results from the restrictions, must be indispensable to the achievement of the
objectives under which the exception is granted, and must not enable the con-
cerns to eliminate competition in respect to a substantial part of the goods con-
cerned. The basic policy is that there are certain purposes which justify making
exceptions to the general rule-improvements in production or distribution of
goods and technical or economic progress-but this must not unduly impair
other purposes of the Treaty, that is, benefit to the consumer and competition.
In cases where the Commission or the European Court of Justice finds that an
agreement falls under the provisions of Art. 85 (3), an exemption is granted to
the application of Art. 85(1) .'
7 Jones, Fundamentals of International Licensing Agreements and Their Application in
the European Community, 7 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 78, 97 (1973).
8 CCH 8046 (1966).
9 The Commission of the European Community is a body of executive character with the
function of "ensuring the application of the provisions of [the] Treaty, and of the provisions
enacted by the institutions of the Community in pursuance thereof." Art. 155. It has limited
powers of decision in matters designated to it by the Treaty, and is directed to "formulate
recommendations or opinions." The Commission performs general staff work, while more
important decisions are reserved for the Council of Europe, a body representing the govern-
ments of the Member States. The acts of the Commission and the Council may be challenged
[December 1973]
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III. Interpretation of Article 85
In interpreting Art. 85 (1), the Court and the Commission have not adopted
rules of per se illegality of contract terms. They have, in each case, looked to
whether the contract clause had an effect on competition or might have such an
effect. This is the doctrine of "effet sensible" or "appreciable effect"-in order
to fall under Art. 85 (1), the agreement must have an appreciable effect on com-
petition in the Common Market. For example, in Volk v. Verwaecke, 0 the
Court upheld a contract term providing for exclusive right of sale within a na-
tional territory and for protection of the market because the parties had an in-
significant share of the market. In the recent Notice Concerning Minor Agree-
ments,"1 the Commission set out quantitative guidelines for agreements con-
sidered not to have an "appreciable effect" upon market conditions. If the prod-
ucts to which the agreement relates do not exceed 5 % of the market and if the
annual turnover of the undertakings concerned does not exceed 15 million units
of account (which are in terms of gold, and formerly about 1 U.S. dollar) or
20 million in the case of commercial undertakings, the agreement does not fall
under Art. 85(1)."?
Where the Court or the Commission has found that the effect on market
conditions is appreciable, Art. 85 (1) applies to prevent restraints on competition.
In the Grundig-Consten case' the European Court of Justice held that an
attempt to reserve the French market through use of a French trademark license
contravened Art. 85. The Court adopted a dubious distinction between the
"exercise" and the "existence" of an industrial property right," but it dearly
came down in support of the international principle inherent in Art. 85, as op-
posed to the national property right provided by French law. In other Court of
Justice cases as well, it has been a general intention of the Court to foster the
principle of internationalism. In Sirenae5 the Court held that the owner of an
Italian trademark for cosmetics could not use the mark to prevent import of
the products by a German user of the trademark. In these and other cases,1"
before the Court of Justice. A. ROBERTSON, EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS 167-76 (2nd ed. 1966).
Regulation 17 of 1962, CCH 2401-634 (1962), is the basic regulation under which
the Conmnission acts as an enforcement agent of Art. 85. It requires, with certain exceptions,
that all agreements which fall under Art. 85(1) must be notified to the Commission. The
Commission may then issue a negative clearance, which states that the agreement is not in
violation of Art. 85(1). The Commission may alternatively issue an exemption under Art.
85'(3), or it may declare the agreement void in whole or in part. Failure to file can result in
the agreement being void under Art. 85(2). Article 15 of Regulation 17 also provides for
fines for violations, whether willful or negligent, of Art. 85 or of Art. 86, which deals with
abuses of dominant market positions. The fines may be as much as one million dollars or
10% of the turnover of the last business year.
10 CCH f 8074 (1969).
11 CCH 1 2700 (1970).
12 See J. CUNNINGHAM, THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EEC: A PRACTICAL GUmE 50
(1973).
13 CCH 1 8046 (1966).
14 Jones, supra note 7, at 98 n.69.
15 CCH 8101 (1971); Jones, supra note 7, at 98-99.
16 Beguelin, CCH 1 8149 (1971) (French unfair-competition law held not to apply to
an exclusive distribution contract solely to bar parallel importation); Deutsche Grammophon,
CCH 8106 (1971) '(German law providing exclusive rights of sale to sound-recording




the Court has made it clear that agreements which restrict distribution and sale
of products to national markets in the EEC and which prevent competition by
imports fall under the ban of Art. 85. One exception is Parke-Davis & Co.
7
That case involved a suit brought by Parke-Davis, which held a Dutch patent
on a drug, to prevent imports of the drug from Italy, which does not permit
patenting of drugs. The Court upheld the Parke-Davis claim; to rule otherwise
would have made almost worthless the Dutch patent. This ruling indicates that
the Court will examine the nature of different industrial property rights, and
that some will receive more protection than others.' Patent rights, it appears,
are those considered most entitled to special protection, even at some expense
to the policy of fostering competition across national borders. Under the ruling
in Parke-Davis, the exercise of patent rights does not fall under the prohibition
of Art. 85 as distorting competition, though the concerted use of patents could
in some cases amount to a violation. 9
When an agreement runs afoul of Art. 85, the Court and Commission
have looked to the commercial realities surrounding an agreement to decide
whether it meets the criteria for an exemption under Art. 85(3). In Re
Transocean Marine Paint Association," an agreement among a worldwide
association of marine paint manufacturers giving exclusive trademark rights
within national territories and restricting competition within allotted areas,
along with agreements concerning uniformity of standards and other terms, was
held to appreciably restrict competition within the EEC. It was given an exemp-
tion, however, under Art. 85 (3) because the agreement promoted improved dis-
tribution of marine paint, and because the agreement contained only restrictions
which were indispensable to the improvement of distribution. The Commission
also stressed that this was a new and small enterprise which had only a small
part of the worldwide market for marine paints, and, in consequence, that the
restrictive agreements were necessary for the initial organization of the company
and did not enable it to eliminate competition. Decisions by the Commission
concerning the granting of exemptions have emphasized such factors as lack
of restrictions on exporting in exclusive dealing agreements,"' the benefits re-
ceived by the consumer in terms of better services without a large increase in
price," and the promotion of technical progress."
Another requirement of Art. 85(3) is that the agreement allow to the user
"a fair share of the resulting benefit." In Re D.R.U.-Blondel,24 the Commission
granted an exemption to an agreement by a Dutch firm to give exclusive distri-
bution rights in France to Blondel for enamelled household articles, on the
grounds that the agreement permitted a simpler distribution system. Further,
the Commission found that Blondel had lowered prices, thus giving benefit to
17 OCH 1 8054 (1968).
18 Jones, supra note 7, at 101-02.
19 G. ZAPHIRIOU, EUROPEAN BUsiNESS LAw 254 (1970); Parke, Davis & Co., OCCH
8054 (1968).
20 CCH r 9188 (1967).
21 Re D.R.U.-Blondel, CCH f 9049 (1965).
22 Re Hummel-Isbecque, CCH ff 9063 (1965).
23 Re Eurogypsum, COCH 9220 '(1968); Re ACEC-Berliet, CH 1 9251 (1968).
24 CCH % 9049 (1965).
[December 1973]
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the consumer. In Grundig-Consten,25 on the other hand, the Court found that
prices for the products of the German manufacturer were unreasonably higher
in France than in Germany, so that no exemption could be granted. Such price
differentials will be strong evidence against any application of Art. 85(3).
Benefit to the consumer has also been found where the agreement results in
improvements in the quality of products and in service.2"
These cases emphasize that economic considerations play a major part in
decisions of the Commission with regard to exemptions. With the exception of
prohibitions on exports, which are virtually always banned,27 Commission deci-
sions have emphasized the examination of the effect of any particular agreement
on market conditions, rather than the establishment of standards of per se in-
validity.
2 8
IV. Application of Art. 85 to Patent Licensing Agreements
Patent licensing agreements are the most important forms of industrial
property rights transactions in relation to anti-trust law because they provide
the best means by which limitations in competition can be effectively imposed.29
The Parke-Davis case" is an indication of the degree to which the Court gives
greater protection to patent rights than to, for example, trademark rights.31 No
case has yet reached the European Court of Justice on exclusive licensing agree-
ments of patent rights.
The Commission issued the Notice on Patent License Agreements on De-
cember 24, 1962,2 that indicated certain clauses not falling under the prohibi-
tion of Art. 85 (1). This Notice was intended to indicate the considerations by
which the Commission would be guided in interpreting Art. 85 (1), and was
subject to rules to be developed by judicial practice. Among other terms, it
stated that the licensor could agree: 1) not to authorize any other person to
utilize the invention and not to utilize the invention himself; 2) to grant regional
licenses; 3) to set and enforce standards of quantity and quality; and 4) to
25 CCH 8046 (1966). In Parke, Davis & Co., CCH 11 8054 (1968), the Court ruled
that it was not illegal per se for a patented product to be of higher price than the imported
product, though where an objective ground for the price differential is lacking, this may be an
abuse. In Deutsche Grammophon, CCH 1 8106 (1971), however, the Court seems to have
toughened its stand, by stating that a price differential, if not explainable on objective grounds,
can be conclusive evidence of an abuse of Art. 86, which concerns abuse of dominant position.
This may be in part explained by the greater weight given to patent rights, as in Parke, Davis,
compared with trademark rights, as a Deutsche Gramophon. See Jones, supra note 7, at 101.
26 Re SOPELEM-Langren, CCH f 9488 (1972); Re Davidson Rubber, CCH f 9512
(1972).
27 But see Re Raymond-Nagoya, CGH 1 9513 (1972).
28 Jones, supra note 7, at 111-12.
29 G. ZAPHIRIOU, supra note 19, at 255.
30 CCH 8054 (1968).
31 The Court argued that trademarks were entitled to less protection than patent rights
in Sirena; CCH 8101 (1971), arguing that "The purpose of trademark law is (in contrast
to patent law) not to create a monopoly in favor of the trademark owner and thus to restrict
competition, but to prevent the public from being deceived by misleading names." Id. at
7107. By this logic, the setting up of a monopoly might be justified under a patent right, but
to attempt to do so under a trademark would be a misuse. See Schumacher, A Common
Market Overview of the Competition Problem in the Seventies, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS
OP? DOING BusiNEss IN EUROPE 58, 60 (L. Theberge ed. 1971), Jones, supra note 7, at 101-02.
32 CCH 2698 (1962).
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require the licensee to mark the product with an indication of the patent. These
provisions have been elaborated and, in some cases, modified by the recent deci-
sions of the Commission.
The first two cases to reach the Commission, Re Burroughs-Delplanques3
and Re Burroughs-Geha-Werke," concerned exclusive licensing of patents and
know-how for the manufacture of plasticized carbon paper, by the American cor-
poration Burroughs to the French firm Delplanque and the German firm Geha-
Werke. Burroughs had granted licenses for the use of two patents to these manu-
facturers, agreeing that each was to have the exclusive right to the use of the
patent in their respective countries, and had also given licenses for trademarks
and know-how. The Commission stated that Art. 85 could be applicable to
exclusive licensing of patents because such agreements restrict the freedom of
the licensor to permit the competitive use of the patent within the exclusive
area. 5 In the Burroughs cases, however, the Commission noted that the share
of the market for carbon paper held by the parties to the agreements was small,
about 10%; that the product was relatively new; and that licensors were free
to sell the patented products everywhere in the Common Market. Furthermore,
the Commission felt that other terms of the agreements (e.g., the requirement
that the licensees keep secret any technical knowledge imparted to them by Bur-
roughs) were essential to the licensor. The Commission decided that the agree-
ments did not violate Art. 85 because they did not perceptibly affect competition.
There was a competitive market for the goods, and the licensees could compete
with one another (particularly as the goods were easily transportable) as well
as with other producers."6
In Re Davidson Rubber 7 the Commission was presented with a set of
agreements similar to those in the Burroughs case. The Davidson patents were
for an improved process for making automobile armrests and seat cushions.
Davidson gave licenses for the use of two patents to a German, a French, and
an Italian manufacturer, and agreed not to authorize anyone other than these
manufacturers to utilize its patents or know-how within the specified areas each
was given. 8 The contracts also contained provisions governing use and trans-
mission of know-how and provisions restricting sub-licensing. Although the
contracts had originally contained export bans, these had been removed by the
time of the Commission case. The licensees' production of armrests represented
about a third of the production in the EEC; other independent manufacturers
33 OCH 9485 '(1972).
34 CCH f 9486 (1972).
35 Id. at 9044.
36 Jones, supra note 7, at 103-04.
37 COH 9512 (1972).
38 The German company, Happich, was assigned exclusive use in Germany, Belgium, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden; the Italian company Gallino had exclusive use in
Italy; and the French company Maglum had exclusive use in France. In another contract,
use of the patents to produce auto seat cushions was given to STAR, an Italian company,
with the consent of Gallino.
39 A sub-license required the consent of Davidson. The French company Maglum, with
Davidson's consent, entered into a sub-licensing agreement with C.I.M. in 1965. The Commis-
sion held that this restriction was not covered by Art. 85(1), because it was "covered by the
licensor's exclusive right and also was justified by the licensor's interest in not having its know-
how conveyed without its consent to enterprises other than those authorized to utilize it."
CCH ff 9512, at 9141 (1972).
[December 1973]
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produced about a third, while auto manufacturers themselves produced the re-
maining one third. In Davidson the Commission held that the agreements had
the object and effect of appreciably restricting competition within the Common
Market and fell under Art. 85 (1) because Davidson was restricted from licensing
other producers and because the licensees had a substantial share of the market.0
The basis for different decisions in the two Burroughs cases and the David-
son case lies in the different market situations involved. In all three cases the
Commission stated that the holder of a patent may give licenses for a specified
territory. It went on to qualify this privilege in Davidson:
If, however, the owner agrees to limit the utilization of his exclusive
right to a single enterprise in a particular territory and grants that one
enterprise the right to utilize the invention to the exclusion of other enter-
prises, he loses the possibility of concluding contracts with other applicants
for a license. In some cases, therefore, an exclusive license covering indus-
trial property rights can restrain competition and be prohibited under
Article 85, paragraph 1.-"
The Commission noted that the Davidson process is the most important one of
its type, that the number of competing processes and manufacturers is limited,
and that the Davidson licensees had a substantial part of the market."' The
result, the Commission felt, was that the agreement substantially disadvantaged
third parties, particularly other manufacturers of automobile fittings, because
they were prevented from using the process. The Commission held that the
agreements, consequently, fell under Art. 85 ( 1 ) .'
The Commission looked primarily to the market situation involved in its
holdings in the Burroughs and Davidson cases. In the Burroughs cases there
were competing processes and manufacturers, and the Burroughs process ac-
counted for only a small part of the market for carbon papers that could be
used several times. The market was also, presumably, a wide one, and the prod-
uct was a standard item for business use. The Davidson licensees accounted
for up to 40% of the total production of automobile armrests in their respective
countries. The armrests were designed and manufactured according to the
specifications of the automobile manufacturers and used almost exclusively by
them, as there was virtually no substitute market.4 The Davidson process, it
appears, allowed the three licensees to achieve, vis--vis the other twelve major
manufacturers of automobile armrests, a very dominant position with about a
40 The Commission also made several other specific holdings:
1. An agreement by a licensee not to contest the validity of a patent was held to be invalid
because it "represented a restriction of the actual and potential competitive position without
giving any indication of why it was indispensable for the achievement of the beneficial ob-
jectives of the agreements." COH 1 9512, at 9142 (1972).
2. The Commission upheld a provision granting a non-exclusive license to Davidson and to the
other licensees, for any improvements in the process by any licensees. Id. at 9141.
3. The Commission upheld an agreement to settle any disputes arising under the agreement by
arbitration because, by the terms of the contract, no arbitral settlement could be expected to
arise that could alter the Commission decision in the case. Id.
41 Id. at 9140.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 By "consumer" in the Davidson case, the Commission meant not the ultimate consumer,
but the buyer-the automobile manufacturers.
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third of the total market. Where in the Burroughs cases the market was a com-
petitive one and the product a standard one, in Davidson the market was oligop-
olistic and the product specialized. Restriction of the patent right to the three
exclusive licensees was, in this market situation, held to fall under Art. 85 (1).
The Commission went on in Davidson to consider whether the agreements
might be granted an exemption under Art. 85 (3) on grounds that the agreement
promoted technical or economic progress. To qualify for exemption under Art.
85(3), an agreement must also 1) reserve for users a fair share of the resulting
profit, 2) not impose restrictions that are not indispensable to the realization
of the goals of improving production or distribution or promoting technical or
economic progress, and 3) not make it possible to eliminate competition for a
substantial part of the products concerned. The Commission decided that the
agreements did promote technical and economic progress, primarily because
they permitted use of the process in the EEC and provided for development and
improvement of the process. 5 In discussing the grounds for exemption, the
Commission stressed the commercial necessity for such an agreement in order
that the process might be introduced and developed. It recognized that the pro-
cess might not have been introduced at all if the restrictions on territories had
not been set up for the licensees.4" The Commission saw advantages to the auto-
mobile manufacturers not in terms of a fair share of the profits, but in terms
of the availability of the process and of a ready source of supply. The Com-
mission also argued that the effective introduction of the process into the EC
required limitation of the number of licensees for the benefit of the licensees,
who would have to set up production facilities for the process. The Commission
further decided that the restraint on competition was not excessive. Consider-
ing the same market situation in which it had decided that the effect was appre-
ciable under Art. 85 (1), the Commission decided that the effect was not exces-
sive under Art. 85(3). The licensees were not considered to be in a position to
eliminate competition because they held a one-third share of the market. The
Commission, therefore, held that the agreements fulfilled the conditions for
applying the exemption under Art. 85(3)."'
In Re Raymond-Nagoya,9 decided the same day as Davidson, a German
subsidiary of a French limited partnership granted licenses for exclusive use in
Japan and other Far Eastern countries to a Japanese company for a patented
process for producing plastic automobile fasteners. This license contained a pro-
vision that the Japanese company would not export fasteners to any European
countries-a type of provision which was specifically disapproved in Davidson.
Nevertheless, the Commission held that the license agreement did not fall under
Art. 85; the specialized nature of the fasteners and the resulting market for the
45 CCH % 9512, at 9141 (1972).
46 Id. at 9142.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 CCH Y 9513 (1972). In Re Kodak, OCH 9378 (1970), the Commission granted
negative clearance to a distribution agreement between Kodak and its European subsidiaries
on condition that certain market-splitting terms be modified. This included the removal of a
ban on exports to other EEC countries. However, as in Raymond-Nagoya, the Commission
permitted a ban on exports to countries outside the EEC, arguing that these were unlikely
to affect competition within the EEC.
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fasteners were such that the Japanese company was not likely to wish or be able
to compete effectively in the EEC. The agreement in consequence did not have
an appreciable effect on competition within the Common Market." The Com-
mission particularly noted that the plastic fasteners were designed in close con-
sultation with auto manufacturers and that it was very unlikely that any Eu-
ropean manufacturer would wish to contract with the Japanese firm on this
basis. 1
V. Application of Art. 85 to Particular Types of Patent License Clauses
The cases of the Commission and the Court strike a balance between en-
couraging competition and permitting restrictions which provide other beneficial
effects. In practice, the EEC is somewhat less restrictive than are the United
States courts in applying anti-trust principles to patent licensing agreements.2
The recent cases provide fairly clear guidelines for the approach of the Com-
mission to particular patent license clauses though the flexibility of this approach
leaves the application of these guidelines highly dependent on the facts of any
individual case.5"
A. Exclusive Right to Use
The 1962 Notice on Patent Licensing Agreements provides that agreements
giving exclusive use of the patent do not fall under Art. 85(1). This has been
modified by the decisions in Burroughs, and especially in Davidson, where the
Commission argued that an exclusive license could, in certain circumstances, be
restrictive of competition."' If the effect on competition is "appreciable," it will
fall under Art. 85(1); but an exemption may be granted under Art. 85(3)
provided the exclusivity is necessary to interest potential licensees and provided
the other requirements of Art. 85 (3) are met. Art. 85 (1) is especially applicable
in narrow, oligopolistic markets such as that in Davidson.5
B. Exclusive Sales Licenses and Export Bans"8
In Davidson, license terms providing for exclusive right of sale within
national territories were modified at the request of the Commission to become
non-exclusive. Such terms cannot be used to restrict trade between member
50 CCH f 9513, at 9147 (1972).
51 Id.
52 Jones, supra note 7, at 93-96.
53 For consideration of the application of Commission decisions to particular clauses, see
also J. CuNNIN;HAm, supra note 12, at 154-61; Jones, supra note 7, at 102-10.
54 CCH 11 9512 (1972).
55 Jones, supra note 7, at 103.
56 In the U.S., a territorial restriction cannot be enforced against a purchaser of a
patented article who resells outside the authorized territory of the seller. As in the EEC, the
patent monopoly only extends to the first sale of the product. Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed
Co., 157 U.S. 659 (1895); Hobbie v. Jennison, 149 U.S. 355 (1893); Adams v. Burke, 84
U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873). A territorial license to manufacture is valid under section 261
of the Patent Code. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970). See Brownell v. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co., 211
F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1954).
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states. Export bans also cannot be used to restrict competition. Export bans
forbid licensees from exporting into the territories of other licensees; such bans
provide protection against competition for each of the territorial licensees within
the particular territory of the license. In Raymond, however, the Commission
upheld an export ban on the Japanese licensee, because it would have no appre-
ciable effect on competition in the EEC.57
C. Restrictions on Methods of Exploitation"
Under the Notice a license may be limited to manufacture, use, or sale;
such a limitation on the use of the patent does not fall under Art. 85 (1).
In Davidson the Commission had no difficulty in approving one license limiting
the use of the process to manufacture of automobile seat cushions and forbidding
use of the process for the manufacture of automobile armrests.
D. Tie-in Agreements9
Tie-in agreements provide that the patent licensee must purchase supplies
for production from the licensor. Such an agreement may provide greater profits
for the licensor by restricting competition in the market for the supplies, and can
also be used as an aspect of quality control of the patented process. Under the
Notice, requirements for purchase of supplies from the licensor can be upheld
only where this is necessary for the technically perfect exploitation of the patent.
Where such tied sources of supply are not for purposes of quality control, as,
for example, where quality control can be assured by objective standards, such a
provision would fall under Art. 85 (1). In many cases these arrangements are
also prohibited by national law.6"
E. Quantitative Restrictions6
Quantitative restriction terms place limits on the output of the articles
produced under license, either by quotas or by royalty rates dependent on output.
The Notice provides that the limitation of the quantity of products to be manu-
57 CCII 9513 (1972).
58 U.S. courts have upheld restrictions on the use of patents with respect to the type of
article manufactured, see e.g., Atlas Imperial Diesel Engine Co. v. Lanova Corp., 79 F. Supp.
1002 (D. Del. 1948), and with respect to the use of the article made under the license, Gen-
eral Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, aff'g 304 U.S. 175 (1938).
Such terms have been criticized because they allow the patent owner to carve out fields in
which he is not manufacturing with licensees who would otherwise be competitors. Marquis,
Limitations on Patent License Restrictions: Some Observations, 58 IowA: L. Rlv. 41. 65-71
(1972).
59 In general, it is patent misuse in the U.S. to grant a license for a patent on the con-
dition that the licensee purchase unpatented supplies or components from the licensor. Leitch
Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938); Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Dev.
Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931). Such a contract will be illegal per se under the Sherman Act
if it forecloses a substantial amount of commerce in the tied product. Int'l Salt Co. v.
United States, 322 U.S. 392 (1947).
60 Jones, supra note 7, at 108.
61 Although of questionable authority today, several U.S. cases have upheld the right
of a licensor to limit the maximum number of items a licensee can manufacture under a
license, either by imposing exorbitant royalties after a certain production level is attained,
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factured or of the number of acts constituting exploitation does not fall under
Art. 85 (1). In Burroughs, a term that the licensee was to produce in quantity
sufficient to meet the demand was regarded as not restrictive."' One author has
suggested that the Commission might now consider that limits on maximum
production are restrictive.6s
F. Grant-back Clauses"'
Grant-back clauses require the licensee to supply the licensor with informa-
tion about improvements in the licensed product or process, and to grant the
licensor a license or assignment of any patented improvements the licensee
makes. The Notice held not to fall under Art. 85(1) undertakings concerning
the disclosure of experience gained in exploiting the invention or the grant of
licenses for inventions in the field of perfection or application; this, however,
applies to undertakings entered into by the licensee only if these undertakings are
not exclusive and if the licensor has entered into similar undertakings. This re-
quires that grant-back clauses be reciprocal and non-exclusive.6" In Burroughs
and Davidson clauses, providing for the initial granting of technical information
caused no problem; in Davidson, clauses providing that the parties inform one
another of improvements and grant non-exclusive licenses for any patents on
improvements of the process were upheld.6 In Raymond the Commission re-
quired amendment of a grant-back clause. In the original clause, Nagoya was
required to transfer ownership and to grant exclusive licenses to inventions out-




Standards of quality may be set by the licensor for proper use of the patent.
A license may further provide for inspection or other controls to assure that
standards of quality are met. The Notice approved the setting of quality stan-
dards or obligations to procure supplies of certain products imposed on the
or by establishing a direct output quota. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416 '(2d Cir. 1945); United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp.
41 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 377 (1956). Restrictions on the quantity
of an unpatented product with a patented process or machine has less support. United States
v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D. NJ. 1949). See Marquis, supra note 56, at 52.
62 CCH [ 9486 (1972).
63 J. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 12, at 156-57.
64 Grant-back clauses have been held not to be illegal per se in the U.S., but they have
been subject to attack. In Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S.
637 (1947), the Supreme Court upheld a grant-back clause, but emphasized that the device
could be used so as to violate the anti-trust laws. But see United States v. General Electric
Co., 115 F. Supp. 835 (D. N.J. 1953). See Chevigny, The Validity of Grant-Back Agreements
Under the Anti-Trust Laws, 34 FoRD L. Pmv. 569 (1968). Exclusive rights are especially
subject to attack. Turner, Patents, Anti-Trust and Innovation, 28 U. PITT. L. Rv. 151, 153-
60 (1966).
65 For a criticism of these restrictions on grant-back clauses, see .T. CUNNINGHAM, SUpra
note 12, at 159.
66 CCH 1 9512 (1972).
67 CCH 9513 (1972).
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licensees-insofar as they are indispensable for the technically perfect exploita-
tion of the patent. Burroughs and Raymond both contained terms on quality
which were not considered restrictive. In Burroughs the agreement was to con-
form to Burroughs's technical instructions, and this was considered non-restrictive
because the sole purpose was to permit technically adequate exploitation of the
patent.8 In Raymond Nagoya agreed to permit certain quality controls of the
products and manufacturing processes. The Commission held that "these quality
controls [were] necessary for the proper exploitation of the invention and the
know-how and [were] to this extent permissible."69
H. Limitations on Sub-licensing
Licensing of a patent may be exclusive to the licensee, or it may provide for
sub-licensing. Restrictions on sub-licensing may be used to set limits to competi-
tion in the article or for other purposes, e.g., to protect secret know-how. The
Notice, I(A) (4)c, upheld limitations on the licensee's granting of sub-licenses.
In Davidson a requirement that sub-licenses had to be with Davidson's consent
was upheld (one such sub-license was in fact granted), and the Commission
held this to be part of the monopoly acquired by the patent owner." In Bur-
roughs the Commission upheld a term forbidding sub-licenses, on the grounds
that such a term was necessary to keep know-how secret."
I. Royalty Terms 2
Patent license agreements generally provide for the payment of percentage
royalties based on production of the article. In Davidson royalties were based on
net selling price or the cost price of the raw materials used, and this was upheld
without comment." In Burroughs a minimum royalty with a fixed rate was ap-
proved, also without comment. 4 In Raymond a clause providing that if mini-
mum license fees are not reached the license would become non-exclusive was
also upheld without comment.7 ' None of these terms would appear to have any
restrictive effect on competition. Differential royalty rates which tend to hinder
penetration of one licensee's market by another and those which are clearly
discriminatory would probably fall under Art. 85 (1). In Re Henkel-Colgate
the Commission indicated that differing royalties for licensees can raise problems
of market sharing under Art. 85.
68 CCH 9486 (1972).
69 CCH 9513 (1972).
70 CGH 9512 (1972).
71 CCHi 1 9513 (1972).
72 Discriminatory royalty rates for ulterior purposes have been found illegal in the U.S.
LaPeyre v. F.T.C., 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966). But see Note, 65 McH. L. REv. 1631
(1967).
73 CCH f 9512 (1972).
74 CCH f 9486 (1972).
75 CCH 9513 (1972).




Under the Notice, I(B), "obligations whereby the licensee has to mark the
products with an indication of the patent" do not fall under Art. 85(1). In
Burroughs the licensee was required to use Burroughs's trademark and to affix
patent information to the patented products, and this was upheld by the Com-
mission because the sole purpose of the obligation of the licensee was to facilitate
control of the quality and quantity of the products covered by the agreement. 8
The licensees had the right to use other marks as well, the Commission pointed
out.
70
K. Agreements Not to Contest Patent Validitys°
For the benefit of the licensor, terms may be included which forbid the
licensee from challenging the validity of the patent, and thereby perhaps obtain-
ing use of the process or article without the need to pay patent royalties. In
Davidson the Commission reaffirmed language in Burroughs and required the
removal of a clause prohibiting the contest of patent validity by the licensee. The
Commission held that the condition "represented a restriction of the actual and
potential competitive position without giving any indication of why it was in-
dispensable for the beneficial objectives of the agreements."8' In Raymond, how-
ever, the Commission applied the "appreciable effect" rule to permit such a
term, because it was highly unlikely that it would have any effect on trade in the
EEC.82 Some continental legal systems retain the rule that one is estopped both
to claim a benefit and to challenge the right under which that is granted-one
cannot both "approbate and reprobate." It appears that these restrictions will
still apply, but that the Commission will oppose a term which is wider in scope
than the national law.83
L. Arbitration Agreements
Arbitration agreements provide that if a dispute arises between the parties,
the dispute will be settled by arbitration rather than by suit. These were upheld
in Burroughs and Davidson. In Davidson the Commission held that, in the cir-
cumstances, the terms did not "give rise to an expectation of arbitral settlements
that could alter the decision in [the] case."84
77 In the U.S., tie-in schemes of trademark and patent licenses have been held illegal
under the Sherman Act, by analogy to other tie-in cases. Switzer Bros. v. Locklin, 297 F.2d
39 (7th Cir. 1961).
78 CCH 11 9486 (1972).
79 Id.
80 The licensee estoppel doctrine was abolished in the U.S. by the Supreme Court in
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). See Bendix Corp. v. Balax, 421 F.2d 809 (7th
Cir. 1970).
81 CCH ff 9512 (1972).
82 CCH f 9513 (1972).
83 J. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 12, at 159-60.
84 CCH 9512 (1972).
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M. "Most Favored Licensee" Clauses"
To protect the licensee against competition by a possible subsequent licensee
with more favorable license terms, a "most favored licensee" clause can be used.
Under such a clause the original licensee is assured terms as favorable as those
given to any other licensee. Such a clause was allowed in Raymond. The clause
provided that no other license would have "more favorable terms of exploi-
tation. ' 's6
N. Know-how Secrecy "
Where the licensor also provides non-patented know-how to the licensee,
terms may be included to provide that this know-how be kept secret by the
licensee. In Burroughs requirements that secrecy be maintained for ten years
after the license period and that models, designs, etc., embodying know-how be
returned within 90 days of the termination of the license, were upheld by the
Commission. Such terms would seem to receive liberal treatment in the EEC
under the language in Burroughs:
Secrecy is essential for technical know-how which is a collection of in-
dustrial processes that are not protected by legal provisions on industrial
property. Secrecy is a necessary condition if the owner of the technical
knowledge is to assign it to other enterprises in order to have it fully ex-
ploited and it is a prerequisite for any commercial exploitation of the
technical know-how, so long as such knowledge is not in the public domain s
0. Life of License'8
The duration of a license might exceed the life of the patent itself, especially
if the license is for use of know-how and trademarks as well as for the patent.
The Notice was expressly limited to clauses of a duration not exceeding the
period of validity of the patent. Where a license is for a longer duration, it is
likely that terms acceptable only in a patent license would not be acceptable as
far as they are outside Art. 85(1) ."° The Notice, I(A) (4) a, does provide that
85 Such terms have also been upheld in the U.S. See Cold Metal Process Co. v. McLouth,
170 F.2d 369 (6th Cir. 1948).
86 CCH % 9513 (1972).
87 In the U.S., trade secret licensing was upheld by the Supreme Court in Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). This has been called into question
by Lear Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). See, Kittler, Current State of Patent and
Know-How Licensing, 27 Bus. LAw. 691 (1972), and Adelman & .auss, Inventions and
the Law of Trade Secrets. after Lear v. Adkins, 16 WAYNE L. Rav. 77 (1969), which sug-
gests that more radical changes in this area of the law may be undertaken in further decisions.
88 CCH % 9486, at 9042 (1971). See Drysdale & Stephens-Ofner, Know-How Licensing,
123 NE w LAW JOURNAL 218 (1973).
89 In the U.S., payment of royalties after the expiration period has been held to be void
and the entire license tainted. E.g., Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); see Lear Inc.
v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). In a case with close analogies to patent licenses, the Su-
preme Court upheld short term gasoline station leases, while pointing out that suppliers
might attempt to use such leases to set up price maintenance programs through fear of non-
renewal, and that such coercion would be illegal. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13
(1967); Marquis, supra note 56, at 49.
90 J. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 12, at 157-58.
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licenses may be limited in time. In Davidson the Commission approved licenses
for the life of the patent, and a sub-license which ran from year to year9 1 In
Burroughs-Delplanque a license for a fixed term, which then ran from year to
year, was upheld without comment.92 In Burroughs-Geha the licenses were for
trademarks and know-how as well as for patent rights, and presumably for this
reason, the Commission upheld without comment a term which provided that
royalties would be reduced by 50% in the event that Burroughs no longer had
patents or no longer had protection under patent applications.9
P. Restrictions on Selling Price"
The Commission has not considered license terms with restrictions on mini-
mum prices, but it is reasonable to assume that these would be held to restrict
competition with regard to price.9"
VI. Conclusion
The recent Commission cases indicate the degree to which the Commission
looks to market and other economic factors in its application of the rules on
competition of the Rome Treaty to licensing agreements. Virtually no contract
provision is illegal per se as a restraint on competition. Most objectionable are
provisions for banning exports and forbidding litigation of the validity of patents
by a licensee; even these provisions were upheld by the Commission in Raymond-
Nagoya, where the licensee was a Japanese company and the provisions were not
likely to affect competition in the EEC." In any case involving exports to an
EEC country, these provisions would fall under Art. 85(1). An export ban
particularly conflicts directly with the goal of a single, unified European market.
Other contract provisions are judged in light of the market situation. The
emphasis is on the actual effect of the agreement on trade and competition. In
Burroughs, where the licensees had only 10% of the market, where the licensor
could compete with the licensees, and where the nature of the product w&s such
as to make competition among producers easy throughout the EEC, the Com-
mission held that the granting of exclusive manufacturing rights did not fall
under Art. 85.11 In Davidson the licensees held dominant positions in an
oligopolistic market, the process was the most important of its type, and the
products were highly specialized. Nonetheless, the Commission, while not grant-
ing negative clearance, did grant an exemption to the agreement largely on
grounds of the commercial reasonableness of the agreements.9 ' Not to grant such
91 CCH f1 9512 (1972).
92 CCH 9485 (1972).
93 CCH 9486 (1972).
94 The Supreme Court has held that it is not illegal to have a price fixing clause for a
manufacturing patent owner. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
Recent cases, however, have limited this right, and suggest that legal price fixing in patent
licenses may not long survive. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948);
United States v. Huck Mfg. Co., 382 U.S. 197 '(1965) (semble), aff'g mem. 227 F. Supp. 791
(E.D. Mich. 1964). See, Marquis, supra note 58, at 50-52.
95 J. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 12, at 161; Jones, supra note 7, at 109 n.89.
96 CCH 9513 (1972).
97 CCH 1 9486 (1972).
98 CCH 9512 (1972).
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exemption, the Commission seemed to be saying, would tend to prevent the in-
troduction of technical advances into the EEC.9 To Davidson and the licensees,
an exemption is almost as useful as a negative clearance. The only effective dif-
ference is that the exemption does not necessarily bind the courts of member
states. In the Davidson contracts an arbitration agreement upheld by the Com-
mission prevents litigation on the contracts between the parties in the member
states in any case so that the exemption should have the same effect, as between
the parties to the agreement, as a negative clearance.'
The decisions in these cases give greater importance to patent rights than
to other property rights such as copyrights and trademarks. The Court pointed
out in Sirena that the purpose of a trademark right is to prevent the public from
being deceived by misleading names, but that the purpose of a patent right is
in fact to create a monopoly in favor of the owner of the right.'0 ' In Davidson
there is an effective splitting of the market along national boundaries through
use of patent licenses. The licensees have plants located only in particular
countries, dealing closely with national auto manufacturers; this situation and
the specialized nature of the products produces an effective splitting of the market
on national lines. This would not be permitted through use of copyright or trade-
mark licenses. The Commission in Davidson tried to strike a balance between
present commercial realities and the goal of a unified market, but the effect of
the decision is to permit commercial considerations to dominate. It is not clear
in what sort of market the Commission would cease to apply the logic of
Davidson; at some point the market position of the licensees would be so
dominant as to enable the licensees to eliminate competition for a substantial part
of the products concerned, and an exemption under Art. 85(3) would not be
granted.
Although patent rights are accorded greater protection than other industrial
property rights, this protection is in some ways limited in the Burroughs and
Davidson cases. These cases represent a shift in the emphasis of Commission
cases from consideration of legal forms to greater consideration of the actual
market effect of particular patent licensing agreements. Previously patent licens-
ing agreements were considered to be outside Art. 85. In the 1962 Notice, the
Commission stated that Art. 85(1) was inapplicable to terms in exclusive use
agreements that provided for territorial division of markets by the licensor of
patent rights. The opinion of the Commission at that time was that a patent
licensor was free to use his patent monopoly as he chose. In recent cases, however,
the Commission has argued that a patent license restricts the licensor as well as
the licensee. The licensor who grants an exclusive territorial license limits his
freedom to contract with other potential licensees, and this limitation may have
the effect of restraining competition in the patented article or process. Following
this argument, the Commission has overruled parts of the Notice in the decisions
in Burroughs and Davidson. These decisions indicate that patent licensing ar-
rangements which aim at dividing markets may fall under Art. 85 (1) where
the market is narrow and oligopolistic, as in Davidson. Rather than looking to
99 Id.
100 See note 4 supra.
101 OCH % 8101 (1971).
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the type of the agreement, the Commission has shifted to examination of the
actual market effects of particular agreements.
The Commission follows this same policy in its Notice on Minor Agreements
of May 27, 1970.112 This Notice limits the broad terms of Art. 85(1) to
agreements which might have "appreciable" effect on competition within the
Common Market, and means that small and newly formed companies may
engage in non-competitive practices such as exclusive distributorships and export
bans. In the case of patent licensing agreements, this examination of market
factors has led, in Davidson, to a narrowing of the rights of a patent licensor in
cases where competition might be impaired. Davidson indicates the need for a
licensor to examine the market situation in the particular product in order to
determine the contract terms which will be permitted by the Commission.
The application of the exemption under Art. 85(3) in Davidson shows the
willingness of the Commission to permit agreements which promote technical
progress of some sort. Nonetheless, the decision indicates that any patent licens-
ing agreement must be drawn with careful consideration of the particular market
situation involved in order to avoid running afoul of the Commission and Art.
85. The decision also points out the need to be aware that changes in the
market situation may require changes in the terms of patent licensing agreements.
To a company wishing to enter into licensing agreements with EEC firms,
the principles are clear though their limits are not: 1) Small and newly formed
companies are given broad freedom to engage in practices which would be
"anti-competitive" for larger firms under the 1970 Notice. This applies
especially where a firm is introducing some new technical advance or process.
2) Licensing of patents receives kinder treatment than does licensing of other
forms of industrial property rights and can provide the basis for division of
production and, effectively in some cases, of markets along national lines.
3) Export bans and similar terms within the EEC where they may have an
"appreciable effect," cannot be used to restrict territories of distribution, and the
Commission is especially watchful for contract provisions which aim at market
splitting. 4) The market situation in the product will control the degree to which
other restrictions and contract terms can be used to set up exclusive areas for
production and to restrict competition. The greater the degree of competition in
the market, the more permissive will the Commission be in permitting restrictions
which have the effect of setting up exclusive territories for production and dis-
tribution and which impose other restrictions on the parties. 5) Particularly in
the case of patent licenses, the Commission is liberal in permitting modification of
particular offending terms and in granting exemptions under Art. 85 (3) (where
the agreement has been properly notified), where contract terms, though poten-
tially restrictive, are necessary for proper use of the patent, and where other
abuses are unlikely.
Daniel Grosh
102 CCH f 2700 (1970).
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